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ABSTRACT
As Internet users have become more savvy about the potential for
their Internet communication to be observed, the use of network
traffic encryption technologies (e.g., HTTPS/TLS) is on the rise.
However, even when encryption is enabled, users leak information
about the domains they visit via DNS queries and via the Server
Name Indication (SNI) extension of TLS. Two recent proposals to
ameliorate this issue are DNS over HTTPS/TLS (DoH/DoT) and
Encrypted SNI (ESNI). In this paper we aim to assess the privacy
benefits of these proposals by considering the relationship between
hostnames and IP addresses, the latter of which are still exposed.
We perform DNS queries from nine vantage points around the
globe to characterize this relationship. We quantify the privacy
gain offered by ESNI for different hosting and CDN providers using
two different metrics, the k-anonymity degree due to co-hosting
and the dynamics of IP address changes. We find that 20% of the
domains studied will not gain any privacy benefit since they have
a one-to-one mapping between their hostname and IP address. On
the other hand, 30% will gain a significant privacy benefit with a
k value greater than 100, since these domains are co-hosted with
more than 100 other domains. Domains whose visitors’ privacy
will meaningfully improve are far less popular, while for popular
domains the benefit is not significant. Analyzing the dynamics of
IP addresses of long-lived domains, we find that only 7.7% of them
change their hosting IP addresses on a daily basis. We conclude
by discussing potential approaches for website owners and host-
ing/CDN providers for maximizing the privacy benefits of ESNI.
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1 INTRODUCTION
As users become more aware of the importance of protecting their
online communication, the adoption of TLS is increasing [60]. It is
indicative that almost 200M fully-qualified domain names (FQDNs)
support TLS [38], while Let’s Encrypt [3] has issued a billion cer-
tificates as of February 27, 2020 [4]. Although TLS significantly
improves the confidentiality of Internet traffic, on its own it cannot
fully protect user privacy, especially when it comes to monitoring
the websites a user visits.
Currently, visited domain names are exposed in both i) DNS
requests, which remain unencrypted, and ii) the Server Name Indi-
cation (SNI) extension [56] during the TLS handshake. As a result,
on-path observers can fully monitor the domain names visited by
web users through simple eavesdropping of either DNS requests or
TLS handshake traffic. Several recent proposals aim to improve the
security and privacy of these two protocols. Specifically, DNS over
HTTPS (DoH) [53] and DNS over TLS (DoT) [55] aim to preserve
the integrity and confidentiality of DNS resolutions against threats
“below the recursive,” such as DNS poisoning [32], while Encrypted
Server Name Indication (ESNI) [89] aims to prevent “nosy” ISPs and
other on-path entities from observing the actual visited domain of
a given TLS connection.
In this paper, we quantify the potential improvement to user
privacy that a full deployment of DoH/DoT and ESNI would achieve
in practice, given that destination IP addresses still remain visible to
on-path observers. Although it is straightforward to reveal a user’s
visited site if the destination IP address hosts only that particular
domain, when a given destination IP address serves many domains,
an adversary will have to “guess” which one is being visited.
We use two properties to quantify the potential privacy benefit
of ESNI, assuming the provider of the DoH/DoT server used is fully
trusted (as it can still observe all visited domains): the k-anonymity
property and the dynamics of hosting IP addresses. Assuming that
k different websites are co-hosted on a given IP address (all using
HTTPS with ESNI supported), the privacy of a visitor to one of
those sites increases as the number of k-1 other co-hosted sites
increases. In addition, the more dynamic the hosting IP address is
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for a given site, the higher the privacy benefit of its visitors is, as
the mapping between domain and hosting IP address becomes less
stable, and thus less predictable.
To quantify these two properties, we conducted active DNS mea-
surements to obtain the IP addresses of an average of 7.5M FQDNs
per day drawn from lists of popular websites [7, 70] (§4). To account
for sites served from content delivery networks (CDNs) which may
direct users differently based on their location, we performed name
resolutions from nine locations around the world: Brazil, Germany,
India, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, United Kingdom, United
States, and South Africa. Our measurements were conducted in
two months to investigate how much a network observer can learn
about the domains visited by a user based solely on the IP address
information captured from encrypted traffic.
We find that 20% of the domains studied will not benefit at
all from ESNI, due to their stable one-to-one mappings between
domain name and hosting IP address. For the rest of the domains,
only 30% will gain a significant privacy benefit with a k value
greater than 100, which means an adversary can correctly guess
these domains with a probability lower than 1%. The rest 50% of
the domains can still gain some privacy benefits, but at a lower
level (i.e., 2 ≤ k ≤ 100). While sophisticated website fingerprinting
attacks based on several characteristics of network packets (e.g.,
timing and size [45, 68, 74, 78, 79, 101]) can be used to predict the
visited domains, our study aims to provide a lower bound of what
an attacker can achieve.
Moreover, we observe that sites hosted by the top-ten hosting
providers with the highest privacy value (k > 500) are far less
popular (§5.2). These are often less well-known sites hosted on
small hosting providers that tend to co-locate many websites on a
single IP or server. In contrast, the vast majority of more popular
sites would gain a much lower level of privacy. These sites are often
hosted by major providers, including Cloudflare (k = 16), Amazon
(3 ≤ k ≤ 5), Google (k = 5), GoDaddy (k = 4), and Akamai (k = 3).
In addition, we find that frequently changing IP addresses (at
least once a day) are limited to only 7.7% of the domains that we
were able to resolve each day of our study. As expected, dominant
providers in terms of more dynamic IP addresses include major
CDN providers, such as Amazon, Akamai, and Cloudflare (§5.4).
Finally, we validate and compare our main findings by repeat-
ing part of our analysis using two different public DNS datasets
(§6), and provide recommendations for both website owners and
hosting/CDN providers on how to maximize the privacy benefit
offered by the combination of DoH/DoT and ESNI (§7). In particular,
website owners may want to seek hosting services from—the un-
fortunately quite few—providers that maximize the ratio between
co-hosted domains per IP address, and minimize the duration of
domain-to-IP mappings. Hosting providers, on the other hand, can
hopefully aid in maximizing the privacy benefits of ESNI by increas-
ing the unpredictability of domain-to-IP mappings.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section, we provide an overview of the shortcomings of DNS
and TLS when it comes to user privacy, along with the suggested
improvements of DNS over HTTPS/TLS (DoH/DoT) and Encrypted
Server Name Indication (ESNI).
2.1 DNS and DoH/DoT
The DNS protocol exposes all requests and responses in plaintext,
allowing anyone with the privilege to monitor or modify a user’s
network traffic to eavesdrop or tamper with it. For example, a man-
on-the-side attacker can send spoofed DNS responses to redirect a
victim to malicious websites [32], while state-level organizations
can manipulate DNS responses to disrupt connections for censor-
ship purposes. The DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) [36] were
introduced in 1997 to cope with these and other security issues by
assuring the integrity and authenticity of DNS responses (but not
their confidentiality). However, DNSSEC is still not widely deployed
due to deployment difficulties and compatibility issues [23, 29, 44].
As an attempt to enhance the security and privacy of the DNS
protocol, two emerging DNS standards were recently proposed:
DoH [53] and DoT [55]. These technologies aim to not only ensure
the integrity and authenticity of DNS traffic, but also its confidential-
ity to some extent. Using DoH/DoT, all DNS queries and responses
are transmitted over TLS, ensuring their integrity against last-mile
adversaries who would otherwise be in a position to launch man-
in-the-middle (MiTM) and man-on-the-side (MoTS) attacks. In this
work, we specifically characterize the protection of user privacy
from nosy ISPs and other last-mile entities provided by DoH/DoT.
Although the benefits of DoH/DoT against last-mile adversaries
are clear, this comes with the cost of fully trusting a third-party op-
erator of the DoH/DoT resolver on which users have outsourced all
their DNS resolutions [51]. Several companies already offer public
DoH/DoT resolvers, including Google [42, 43] and Cloudflare [108].
In fact, we later show in §5.2 that these two companies are also
the most dominant hosting providers of domains in the top lists
of popular sites. Popular browsers have also started introducing
support for DoH/DoT, e.g., Mozilla Firefox since version 62 [72]
(which is now enabled by default).
2.2 SSL/TLS and ESNI
During the TLS handshake [31], the two communicating parties
exchange messages to acknowledge and verify the other side using
digital certificates, and agree on various parameters that will be
used to create an encrypted channel. In a client-server model, the
client trusts a digital certificate presented by the server as long as
it has been signed by a trusted certificate authority.
Ideally, private or sensitive information should be transmitted
only after the TLS handshake has completed. This goal can be easily
achieved when a server hosts only a single domain (known as IP-
based virtual hosting). Name-based virtual hosting, however, which
is an increasingly used approach for enabling multiple domains
to be hosted on a single server, necessitates a mechanism for the
server to knowwhich domain name a user intends to visit before the
TLS handshake completes, in order to present the right certificate.
The Server Name Indication (SNI) extension was introduced in
2003 as a solution to this problem. The SNI extension contains a
field with the domain name the client wants to visit, so that the
server can then present the appropriate certificate. Unfortunately,
since this step is conducted prior to the completion of the TLS
handshake, the domain name specified in SNI is exposed in plaintext.
Consequently, all the privacy risks associated with the traditional
design of DNS discussed above also apply to the SNI extension. For
instance, Internet authorities in several countries have been relying
on the SNI field for censorship purposes [21, 49].
ESNI has recently been proposed as part of TLS version 1.3 [89] to
resolve the issue of SNI revealing the domain visited by a user. Using
ESNI, clients encrypt the SNI field towards a given server by first
obtaining a server-specific public key through a well-known ESNI
DNS record. Obviously, due to this reliance on DNS, any privacy
benefits of ESNI can only be realized when used in conjunction with
DoH/DoT—otherwise any last-mile observer would still be able to
observe a user’s plaintext DNS queries and infer the visited TLS
server. In September 2018, Cloudflare was among the first providers
to announce support for ESNI across its network [83].
3 THREAT MODEL
We assume an idealistic future scenario in which both DoH/DoT and
ESNI are fully deployed on the Internet. Under this assumption, an
on-path observer will only be able to rely on the remaining visible
information, i.e., destination IP addresses, to infer the sites being
visited by the monitored users. The extent to which this inference
can be easily made depends on i) whether other domains are hosted
on the same IP address, and ii) the stability of the mapping between
a given domain and its IP address(es).
The probability with which an adversary can successfully infer
the visited domain can be modeled using the k-anonymity property,
with k corresponding to the number of domains co-hosted on the
same IP address. The probability of a successful guess is inversely
proportional to the value of k, i.e., the larger the k, the more difficult
it is for the adversary to make a correct guess, thus providing
increased user privacy.
The above threat model is oblivious to distinguishable charac-
teristics among a group of co-hosted websites, such as popularity
ranking, site sensitivity, and network traffic patterns. We should
thus stress that the situation in practice will bemuch more favorable
for the adversary. Even for a server with a high k, it is likely that
not all k sites will be equally popular or sensitive. Although the
popularity and sensitivity can vary from site to site, depending on
who, when, and from where is visiting the site [48], an adversary
can still consider the popularity and sensitivity of the particular k
sites hosted on a given IP address to make a more educated guess
about the actual visited site.
Utilizing the ranking information of all domains studied, we
model such an adversarial scenario in §5.3 and show that our threat
model based on k-anonymity is still valid. In addition, page-specific
properties such as the number of connections towards different
third-party servers and the number of transferred bytes per connec-
tion can be used to derive robust web page fingerprints [16, 17, 27,
35, 47, 65, 81, 99], which can improve the accuracy of attribution
even further. Although identifying a visited website among all pos-
sible websites on the Internet by relying solely on fingerprinting is
quite challenging, applying the same fingerprinting approach for
attributing a given connection (and subsequent associated connec-
tions) to one among a set of k well-known websites is a vastly easier
problem.
Consequently, an on-path observer could improve the probability
of correctly inferring the actual visited website by considering the
popularity and sensitivity of the co-hosted domains on the visited
IP address, perhaps combined with a form of traffic fingerprint-
ing. Although such a more powerful attack is outside the scope of
this work, as we show in the rest of the paper, our results already
provide a worrisome insight on how effective an even much less
sophisticated attribution strategy would be, given the current state
of domain co-hosting.
4 METHODOLOGY
In this sectionwe review existing DNSmeasurement techniques and
highlight the data collection goals of our study. We then describe
how we select domains and vantage points to achieve these goals.
4.1 Existing DNS Measurements
Previous studies use passive measurement to observe DNS traffic on
their networks [30, 94, 100]. However, passive data collection can
suffer from bias depending on the time, location, and demographics
of users within the observed network. Passive data collection can
also raise ethical concerns, as data collected over a long period of
time can gradually reveal online habits of monitored users.
There are also prior works (by both academia and industry)
that conducted large-scale active DNS measurements for several
purposes and made their datasets available to the community [61,
87]. However, these datasets have two common issues that make
them unsuitable to be used directly in our study. First, all DNS
queries are resolved from a single location (country), while we aim
to observe localized IPs delivered by CDNs to users in different
regions. Second, although these datasets have been used in many
other studies, none of the prior measurements are designed to
filter out poisoned DNS responses (e.g., as a result of censorship
leakage), which can significantly affect the accuracy of the results
and negatively impact data analysis if not excluded. We discuss
steps taken to sanitize these datasets in Appendix B.
4.2 Our Measurement Goals
Ideally, we would like to derive the mapping between all live do-
main names and their IP addresses. Unfortunately, this is extremely
challenging to achieve in practice because there are more than 351.8
million second-level domain names registered across all top-level
domains (TLDs) at the time we compose this paper [98], making it
unrealistic to actively resolve all of them with adequate frequency.
Furthermore, not all domains host web content, while many of
them correspond to spam, phishing [80, 85], malware command
and control [8], or parking pages registered during the domain
dropcatching process [63], which most users do not normally visit.
As we aim to study the privacy benefits of ESNI, we thus choose
to focus on active sites that are legitimately visited by the majority
of web users. To derive such a manageable subset of sites, we relied
on lists of website rankings, but did not consider only the most
popular ones, as this would bias our results. Instead, we expanded
our selection to include as many sites as possible, so that we can
keep our measurements manageable, but at the same time observe a
representative subset of legitimately visited domains on the Internet.
4.3 Domains Tested
There are four top lists that are widely used by the research com-
munity: Alexa [7], Majestic [70], Umbrella [97], and Quantcast [84].
However, it is challenging to determine which top list should be
chosen, as recent works have shown that each top list has its own
issues that may significantly affect analysis results if used with-
out some careful considerations [64, 90, 92]. For instance, Alexa
is highly fluctuating, with more than 50% of domain names in the
list changing every day, while Majestic is more stable but cannot
quickly capture sites that suddenly become popular for only a short
period of time. Pochat et al. [64] suggest that researchers should
combine these four lists to generate a reliable ranking.
For this study, we generated our own list by aggregating domains
ranked by Alexa and Majestic from the most recent 30 days for
several reasons. First, these two lists use ranking techniques that are
more difficult and costly to manipulate [64]. Second, they have the
highest number of domains in common among the four. We exclude
domains from Quantcast because it would make our observations
biased towards popular sites only in the US [64]. Lastly, we do
not use domains from Umbrella because the list is vulnerable to
DNS-based manipulation and also contains many domains that do
not host web content [64, 90]. To this end, we studied a total of
13.6M domains with its breakdown shown in Appendix A.
Data scope. Although this subset of domains corresponds to about
4% of all domains in the TLD zone files, we argue that it is still
adequate for the goal of our study, i.e., determining whether the
current state of website co-location will allow ESNI to provide a
meaningful privacy benefit. Considering only this subset of domains
may lead to an under-approximation of the actual k-anonymity
offered by a given IP or set of IPs, as some co-hosted domains may
not be considered. This means that our results can be viewed as a
lower bound of the actual k-anonymity degree for a given visited
IP address, which is still a desirable outcome.
As discussed in §3, the popularity of a website, along with other
qualitative characteristics, can be used by an adversary to improve
attribution. Indeed, given that the long tail of domains that are left
out from our dataset mostly correspond to vastly less popular and
even unwanted or dormant domains [96], any increase in k they
may contribute would in practice be rather insignificant, as (from
an attribution perspective) it is unlikely they will be the ones that
most web users would actually visit.
4.4 Measurement Location and Duration
Due to load balancing and content delivery networks, deriving all
possible IP addresses for a given popular domain is very challenging.
To approximate this domain-to-IP mapping, we performed our own
active DNS measurements from several vantage points acquired
from providers of Virtual Private Servers (VPS). When choosing
measurement locations, we tried to distribute our vantage points
so that their geographical distances are maximized from each other.
This design decision allows us to capture as many localized IP
addresses of CDN-hosted sites as possible. To that end, we run
our measurements from nine countries, including Brazil, Germany,
India, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, United Kingdom, United
States, and South Africa. Our vantage points span the six most
populous continents. From all measurement locations mentioned
above, we send DNS queries for approximately 7.5M domains on a
daily basis. When issuing DNS queries, we enabled the iterative flag
in the queries, bypassing local recursive resolvers to make sure that
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Figure 1: Cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the
number of domains hosted per IP address, as a percentage
of all observed IP addresses. About 70% of all observed IPv4
addresses host only a single domain.
DNS responses are returned by actual authoritative name servers.
The results presented in this work are based on data collected for a
period of two months, from February 24th to April 25th, 2019.
5 DATA ANALYSIS
In this section we use two metrics, k-anonymity and the dynamics
of hosting IP addresses, to quantify the privacy benefits offered
by different hosting and CDN providers. To verify the validity of
our k-anonymity model, we also apply Zipf’s law on the popular-
ity ranking of domains to account for a more realistic (i.e., more
powerful) adversary.
5.1 Single-hosted vs. Multi-hosted Domains
Over a period of two months, from February 24th to April 25th,
2019, we observed an average of 2.2M and 500K unique IPv4 and
IPv6 addresses, respectively, from our daily measurements. Of these
IP addresses, 70% of IPv4 and 79% of IPv6 addresses host only a
single domain, as shown in Figure 1. This means that visitors of the
websites hosted on those addresses will not gain any meaningful
privacy benefit with ESNI, due to the one-to-one mapping between
the domain name and the IP address on which it is hosted. About
95% of both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses host less than 15 domains.
When calculating the percentage of IPv6-supported sites, we
find that less than 15% support IPv6. Regardless of the increasing
trend [28], the future adoption of IPv6 is still unclear [25]. Since
the majority of web traffic is still being carried through IPv4, in the
rest of the paper we focus only on IPv4 addresses.
Based on our measurements, we identify three main ways in
which a domainmay be hosted, in terms of the IP addresses used and
the potential privacy benefit due to ESNI, as illustrated in Figure 2.
In the simplest case, a single-hosted domain may be exclusively
hosted on one or more IP addresses that do not serve any other
domain, towhichwe refer as privacy-detrimental IP addresses (Fig. 2,
left). As there is no sharing of the IP address(es) with other domains,
an adversary can trivially learn which site is visited based solely
on the destination IP address. On the other hand, a multi-hosted
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Figure 2: Different types of domain hosting according to whether they can benefit from ESNI. Single-hosted domains are
exclusively hosted on one or more IP addresses, and thus cannot benefit from ESNI. In contrast, multi-hosted domains are
always co-hosted with more domains on a given IP address, and thus can benefit by ESNI.
domain (Fig. 2, right) may be co-hosted on one or more IP addresses
that always serve at least one or more other domains, to which
we refer as privacy-beneficial IP addresses. Since the destination IP
address always hosts multiple domains, an adversary can only make
a (possibly educated) guess about the actual domain a given user
visits, and thus multi-hosted domains always benefit to some extent
from ESNI—the more co-hosted domains on a given IP address, the
higher the privacy gain offered by ESNI.
Finally, there is a chance that a domain is hosted on a mix of
privacy-detrimental and privacy-beneficial IP addresses, which we
call partially multi-hosted domains (Fig. 2, middle). In that case, only
visitors to the subset of IP addresses that co-host other domains
will benefit from ESNI. Based on our measurements, partially multi-
hosted domains correspond to only a 0.3% fraction (20K) of all
domains (daily average). Single-hosted domains comprise 18.7%
(1.4M) and multi-hosted domains comprise 81% (6M) of all domains.
The privacy degree of a partially multi-hosted domain depends
on the probability that a visitor gets routed to a privacy-beneficial
IP of that domain. In other words, a partially multi-hosted domain
will mostly behave as a multi-hosted domain if the majority of its IP
addresses are privacy-beneficial. In fact, we find that this is the case
for more than 92.5% of the partially multi-hosted domains studied.
Based on this fact, and given its extremely small number compared
to the other two types, in the rest of our paper we merge partially
multi-hosted domains with the actual multi-hosted domains, to
simplify the presentation of our results.
Going back to Figure 1, based on the above breakdown, we
observe that 70% of all IP addresses that host a single domain cor-
respond to 18.7% of all domains, i.e., the single-hosted ones. On the
other hand, the 81% of multi-hosted domains are co-hosted on just
30% of the IP addresses observed.
Next, we analyze the popularity distribution of single-hosted
and multi-hosted domains to identify any difference in the user
population of these two types of domains. Note that we only base
our analysis on the ranking information provided by the top lists
to comparatively estimate the scale of the user base, and not for
absolute ranking purposes. More specifically, we only use the top
100K domains for the analysis in Figure 3, since rankings lower
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Figure 3: CDF of the popularity ranking for single-hosted
and multi-hosted domains.
than 100K are not statistically significant, as confirmed by both
top list providers and recent studies [6, 90]. Figure 3 shows that
single-hosted and multi-hosted domains exhibit a nearly identical
distribution of popularity rankings.
5.2 Estimating the Privacy Benefit of
Multi-hosted Domains
In this section, we focus on the 81% of multi-hosted domains that
can benefit from ESNI, and attempt to assess their actual privacy
gain. Recall that a website can gain some privacy benefit only if it is
co-hosted with other websites, in which case an on-path adversary
will not know which among all co-hosted websites is actually being
visited. We use k-anonymity to model and quantify the privacy
gain of multi-hosted domains.
Going back to Figure 2, we can apply this definition in two ways,
depending on whether we focus on IP addresses or domains. For a
given IP address, its k-anonymity value (“k” for brevity) corresponds
to the number of co-hosted domains. For a given multi-hosted
domain, its k may be different across the individual IP addresses
on which it is hosted, as the number of co-hosted domains on each
Table 1: Top hosting providers offering the highest median
k-anonymity per IP address.
Median Organization Unique Highest
k IPs Rank
3,311 AS19574 Corporation Service 2 1,471
2,740 AS15095 Dealer Dot Com 1 80,965
2,690 AS40443 CDK Global 1 68,310
1,338 AS32491 Tucows.com 1 22,931
1,284 AS16844 Entrata 1 96,564
946 AS39570 Loopia AB 6 19,238
824 AS54635 Hillenbrand 1 117,251
705 AS53831 Squarespace 23 386
520 AS12008 NeuStar 2 464
516 AS10668 Lee Enterprises 4 3,211
Table 2: Top hosting providers with highest number of ob-
served IP addresses.
Median Organization Unique Highest
k IPs Rank
16 AS13335 Cloudflare, Inc. 64,285 112
5 AS16509 Amazon.com, Inc. 47,786 37
5 AS46606 Unified Layer 27,524 1,265
3 AS16276 OVH SAS 22,598 621
3 AS24940 Hetzner Online GmbH 21,361 61
4 AS26496 GoDaddy.com, LLC 16,415 90
2 AS14061 DigitalOcean, LLC 11,701 685
3 AS14618 Amazon.com, Inc. 11,008 11
6 AS32475 SingleHop LLC 10,771 174
2 AS26347 New Dream Network 10,657 1,419
7 AS15169 Google LLC 9,048 1
3 AS63949 Linode, LLC 8,062 2,175
4 AS8560 1&1 Internet SE 6,898 2,580
3 AS32244 Liquid Web, L.L.C 6,412 1,681
3 AS19551 Incapsula Inc 6,338 1,072
4 AS36351 SoftLayer Technologies 6,005 483
3 AS16625 Akamai Technologies 5,862 13
4 AS34788 Neue Medien Muennich 5,679 7,526
6 AS9371 SAKURA Internet Inc. 5,647 1,550
3 AS8075 Microsoft Corporation 5,360 20
of those addresses may be different. Consequently, the k value of
a multi-hosted domain is calculated as the median k of all its IP
addresses.1 In both cases, the privacy gain increases linearly with
k. Based on these definitions, we now explore the privacy gain of
domains hosted on different hosting and CDN providers.
Table 1 shows the top-ten hosting providers offering the high-
est median k-anonymity per IP address (i.e., greater than 500). As
shown in the third column, the average number of unique IP ad-
dresses observed daily for each provider is very low, with half
of them hosting all domains under a single IP address. Using the
1Since most domains have similar k values across their hosting IP addresses, both
mean and median can be used in this case.
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Figure 4: CDF of the k-anonymity for all studied domains
across nine measurement locations (k=1 corresponds to the
18.7% of single-hosted domains).
Hurricane Electric BGP Toolkit, we confirmed that these providers
are indeed small, with many of them managing less than 10K IP
addresses allocated by regional Internet registries. When looking
into the popularity of the websites hosted by these providers, as
shown in the last column, the highest ranked website is only at
the 386th position, hosted on Squarespace, while more than half of
these providers host websites that are well below the top 10K.
Next, we investigate the k-anonymity offered by major providers
that dominate the unique IP addresses observed. Table 2 lists the
top-20 major hosting and CDN providers with more than 5K unique
IP addresses observed. Unlike small hosting providers, these major
providers are home to more popular sites. Indeed, the most popular
sites hosted by these providers are all within the top 10K. In con-
trast to small providers, however, the median k-anonymity per IP
address offered by these providers is quite low, meaning that sites
hosted on them will gain a much lower level of privacy. Except
from Cloudflare, which has the highest k of 16, all other providers
have a single-digit k.
Tables 1 and 2 represent two ends of the privacy spectrum for
multi-hosted domains. On one end, numerous but less popular do-
mains are hosted on providers managing a handful of IP addresses,
benefiting from high k-anonymity; on the other end, fewer but more
popular websites are hosted on providers managing a much larger
pool of millions of IP addresses, suffering from low k-anonymity.
To provide an overall view of the whole privacy spectrum, Fig-
ure 4 shows CDFs of k of all studied domains across nine different
regions. As illustrated, k values are almost identical across the nine
regions from which we conducted our measurements. While our
DNS data shows that there are 471K (CDN-supported) domains
served from different IP addresses depending on the resolution
location, the k values of these domains remain similar regardless
of the DNS resolution origin.
As discussed in §3, a low (e.g., single-digit) k cannot allow ESNI to
offer meaningful privacy, given that i) not all k sites will be equally
popular, and ii) website fingerprinting can be used to improve
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Figure 5: Top providers that host most domains.
attribution accuracy even further [17, 65, 78, 81, 99]. Assuming that
k needs to be greater than 100 to provide meaningful privacy, since
an adversary would correctly guess a domain being visited with
a probability less than 1%, then according to Figure 4, only about
30% of the sites will benefit from domain name encryption. We
conduct a more in-depth analysis of the probability with which an
adversary would correctly guess domains being visited based on
Zipf’s law in §5.3.
Finally, we examine the top-10 providers that host the largest
number of domains among the ones studied. Although these mostly
include some of the providers listed in Table 2, two of them are not
included on that table, and one (Squarespace) is actually included
in Table 1. The violin plot of Figure 5 depicts the top-ten providers
that host most domains. The area of each violin is proportional to
the number of domains hosted by that provider, while the shape of
each violin illustrates the popularity ranking distribution of hosted
websites. The median k of each provider is denoted by the red dot.
Google and Cloudflare are the top hosting providers, with more
than 500K domains each. Other providers host different numbers
of domains, ranging from 315K to 123K.2 Although hosting fewer
domains, both Automattic and Squarespace provide significantly
higher privacy with a k of 110 and 705, respectively.
5.3 Weighting the Privacy Benefit Based on
Domain Popularity
In §5.2, we used the k-anonymity model to quantify the privacy
benefit provided by multi-hosted domains. However, one might
consider that the model does not accurately capture a real-world
adversary, as not all co-hosted domains are equally popular. Adver-
saries could base their guess on the probability that a domain is
more (or less) likely to be visited, according to the visit frequency
of that domain compared to other co-hosted domains. However, it
is infeasible for us to obtain the data of domain visit frequencies,
since this is only known by the respective hosting providers.
Fortunately, prior studies have shown that the relative visit
frequency of domains follows Zipf’s law [15, 106]. More specif-
ically, Zipf’s law states that the relative probability of a domain
(d) being visited is inversely proportional to its popularity ranking
2Note that a website may be hosted on more than one provider [52]. In that case, we
count the site separately for each hosting provider.
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Figure 6: CDF of the probability of correctly guessing a vis-
ited domain based on the k-anonymity value and popularity
ranking information, as percentage of all tested domains.
(Pd ∝ 1/(rankd )α ). We thus apply Zipf’s law3 on the popularity
ranking of domains to compute the probability with which an ad-
versary can correctly guess that a given domain is being visited.
From a privacy-detrimental IP address, it is straightforward for
the adversary to learn the domain being visited as the IP address
solely hosts that single domain. However, given a privacy-beneficial
IP address that hosts multiple domains, a more realistic adversary
would make his guess based on the probability that a domain is
more likely to be visited compared to other co-hosted domains.
In order to compute this probability, we first obtain the domains
d1, . . . ,dn that are hosted on a single IPj and compute their Pd
values according to Zipf’s law. We define Pdi j =
Pdi∑n
k=1 Pdk
as the
probability that domain di was visited when IPj was observed.
For domains that are hosted on multiple IP addresses, the proba-
bility is estimated by taking the median of all probabilities that the
domain is visited from all IP addresses hosting it. We therefore com-
pute the probability that an adversary can correctly guess domain
3For simplicity, we present results with α = 1, following the strict Zipf’s law. However,
adjusting the value of α to match previous observations [15] also gave similar results.
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Figure 7: Longevity distribution of domain-to-IP mappings
as percentage of number of mappings.
di that is hosted on IP1, . . . , IPm as follows:
Pi =median(Pdi1 , . . . , Pdim ) (1)
As shown in Figure 6, our k-anonymity model is a close lower
bound to the case where the adversary considers the popularity
rankings. The figure shows two CDFs of the probability that the
adversary can guess which domain is being visited. The continuous
(blue) line is computed based on the k-anonymity value of co-hosted
domains. Each domain has an equal probability of 1/k to be visited.
The dashed (red) line is computed by applying the Zipf’s law on
the domain popularity. We can see that even if adversaries rely
on domain popularity rankings to improve the accuracy of their
prediction, the highest probability that this guess is correct is similar
to the probability estimated by the k-anonymity value.
5.4 Domain-to-IP Mapping Stability
Besides the degree of co-hosting, the stability of a website’s IP ad-
dress(es) also plays an important role in whether ESNI will provide
meaningful privacy benefits. If the IP address of a website changes
quite frequently, this will have a positive impact on the privacy
offered due to ESNI. Unless adversaries have enough resources to
acquire all domain-to-IP mappings of interest at almost real-time,
they will no longer be able to use the destination IP address as
an accurate predictor of the visited website, because a previously
known domain-to-IP mapping may not be valid anymore. On the
other hand, mappings that remain stable over the time make it
easier for adversaries to monitor the visited websites.
In this section, we examine the stability of domain-to-IP map-
pings, and how it affects privacy. We are particularly interested in
finding how often domain-to-IP mappings change. As discussed
in §4, all top lists of popular sites have their own churn (i.e., new
sites appear and old sites disappear from the lists on a daily basis).
To prevent this churn from affecting our analysis, we consider only
the subset of domains that were present daily on both top lists
(§4.2) during the whole period of 61 days of our study. This set of
domains comprises 2.6M domains, from which we observed a total
of 22.7M unique domain-to-IP mappings because a domain may be
hosted on hundreds of IP addresses.
Figure 7 shows the distribution of the longevity of these map-
pings in days. More than 80% of the mappings last less than four
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Figure 8: CDF of domain popularity for short-term and long-
term domain-to-IP mappings.
consecutive days (short-term mappings), corresponding to 202K
(7.7%) domains served from 400K unique IP addresses. On the other
hand, 13% of the mappings remain unchanged for the whole study
period (long-termmappings), corresponding to 2.4M domains served
from 1.1M unique IP addresses. As also shown in Figure 7, there are
two dominant clusters of domains that either change their hosting
IP addresses frequently or do not change at all. This is a favor-
able result for adversaries, as it implies that they do not have to
keep resolving a large number of domains, since most domain-to-IP
mappings remain quite stable over a long period.
The popularity distribution of the domains that correspond to
these two short-term and long-term mappings is shown in Figure 8.
While domains with short-term mappings are evenly distributed
across the popularity spectrum, domains with long-term mappings
slightly lean towards lower popularity rankings. This result can be
attributed to the fact that more popular websites are more likely
to rotate their IP addresses for load-balancing reasons, while less
popular sites are more likely to be served from static IP addresses.
An increased churn of IP addresses also helps ESNI provide better
privacy. We thus investigated which providers exhibit the highest
churn rate by grouping the IP addresses of short-term mappings ac-
cording to their ASN. Figure 9 shows the top-ten providers with the
highest number of IP addresses in short-term mappings (bars). The
dots indicate the number of domains hosted on those IP addresses.
Although Amazon and Akamai do not top the list of providers that
host most domains (Figure 5), along with Cloudflare they occupy
the top five positions of the providers with the highest number of
dynamic IPs. Google uses a relatively small pool of around 5.3K IP
addresses, to host more domains (41K) than the other providers.
6 COMPARISONWITH OTHER DATASETS
In this section, we analyze existing public DNS datasets to examine
the impact of i) larger datasets (in terms of number of domains),
and ii) more localized vantage points, on the estimation of per-
domain k-anonymity.
The Active DNS Project [61] is currently collecting A records of
about 300M domains derived from 1.3K zone files on a daily basis.
In addition to this effort, Rapid7 [87] also conducts active DNS
measurements at a large scale and offers researchers access to its
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Figure 9: Top providers with the highest number of high-
churn IP addresses.
data. Unlike the Active DNS Project, Rapid7 resolves a much larger
number of domains (1.8B), but with a lower frequency (domains are
resolved only once a week). The dataset includes not only second-
level domains from several TLD zone files, but also lower-level
domains obtained through web crawling and targeted scanning
with Zmap [34].
Different from these datasets, as discussed in §4.2, our domain
name dataset is curated from the global lists of Alexa and Majestic.
We also perform measurements from vantage points around the
world to observe localized DNS responses from CDNs. In contrast,
the above datasets are collected from local vantage points, as their
goal is to maximize the number of observed domains, and not
to exhaustively resolve all potential IP addresses of a domain. In
particular, the Active DNS Project is run from Georgia Tech, while
Rapid7’s data is collected using AWS EC2 nodes in the US. To that
end, we used two datasets from the Active DNS Project and Rapid7
collected on March 29th, 2019 for our comparison. We sanitized
poisoned records from these datasets, as described in Appendix §B,
before analyzing them.
Figure 10 shows the CDF of the k-anonymity value per domain
for all the domains in the Active DNS, Rapid7, and our datasets,
while Figure 11 shows the CDF of the k-anonymity value per do-
main for only common domains among the three datasets.
In Figure 10, when k = 1, there is some difference in the per-
centage of single-hosted domains between the Active DNS Project
(5.3%), Rapid7 (54.3%), and our observation (18.7%). As expected,
the percentage of single-hosted domains for Rapid7 is the high-
est because this dataset is the largest (1.8B FQDNs), and includes
lower-level FQDNs that may host other services (e.g., email, DNS,
SSH) instead of web content. On the other hand, only 5.3% of the
domains in the Active DNS dataset are single-hosted, since the
dataset contains mostly A records of domains extracted from TLD
zone files, instead of many lower-level FQDNs.
When all domains are considered, our observation of single-
hosted domains is in between the two (18.7%) because (as mentioned
in §4.2) we derive our domain name dataset from the two global top
websites lists (Alexa and Majestic), and include not only second-
level domains but also lower-level FQDNs, as long as they are
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Figure 10: CDF of the k-anonymity value per domain as a
percentage of all domains observed from the Active DNS
Project, Rapid7, and our datasets.
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Figure 11: CDF of the k-anonymity value per domain as a
percentage of common domains observed from the Active
DNS Project, Rapid7, and our datasets.
included in the lists and serve web content. This aligns well with
the results of Rapid7 and Active DNS, given the inherent over-
approximation of the Rapid7 dataset (due to non-web services and
highly unpopular or even single-use domains) and the inherent
under-approximation of the Active DNS Project dataset (due to
only domains extracted from TLD zone files).
When considering only common domains, the percentages of
single-hosted domains are 4.1%, 11.7%, and 20.4% for the Rapid7,
Active DNS, and our dataset, respectively. In other words, some
domains classified as single-hosted in our dataset are actually multi-
hosted when considering the larger datasets. This result confirms
our hypothesis discussed in §4.2 that by only considering the two
sets of popular websites, we would have missed those less popular,
random, or even dormant domains in the long tail. Thus, the result
provided by our dataset can be considered as a lower bound value
of the actual k-anonymity, since any increase in k provided by less
well-known, random, or even dormant domains is less meaningful
from the perspective of adversaries whose goal is to reveal a visited
website by incorporating the popularity ranking information in
their “guess.”
At the right end of the CDFs in both Figures 10 and 11, the
two larger datasets exhibit k-anonymity values higher than ours.
The primary reason for this is that these datasets include not only
second-level domains, but also third-level and longer FQDNs. The
higher k values also comprise the long-tail of domains that are not
included in our dataset, including less popular domains, random or
single-use FQDNs used for tracking, and malicious domains [96].
7 DISCUSSION
7.1 Recommendations
While the security benefits of DoH/DoT against on-path adversaries
are clear (e.g., prevention of MiTM orMoTS DNS poisoning attacks),
our findings show that Encrypted SNI alone cannot fully address
the privacy concerns it aims to tackle. More effort and collabora-
tion from all involved parties (i.e., operators of DNS authoritative
name servers, website owners, and hosting and CDN providers) are
needed. In this section we provide some suggestions for maximizing
the privacy benefits of ESNI.
Full Domain Name Confidentiality. In the current designs,
plaintext domain names are exposed through two channels: the
SNI extension in TLS, and traditional DNS name resolutions—the
deployment of DoH/DoT is thus a prerequisite for ESNI. Equiva-
lently, the use of DoH/DoT will not provide any meaningful privacy
if domain names are still exposed through the (unencrypted) SNI
extension in TLS handshake traffic.
Recently, there is a push for the deployment of DoH/DoT, with
major organizations already supporting it (e.g., Google, Cloudflare,
Firefox), though this has not been followed by an equivalent effort
for the deployment of ESNI. An even more complicated method
of securing DNS traffic is DNS-over-HTTPS-over-Tor, which has
been already implemented and supported by Cloudflare [91]. Unless
the confidentiality of domain names is preserved on both channels
(TLS and DNS), neither technology can provide any actual privacy
benefit if deployed individually.
Domain Owners. Website owners who want to provide increased
privacy to their users can seek hosting providers or CDNs that
offer an increased ratio of co-hosted domains per IP address and/or
highly dynamic domain-to-IP mappings. In practice, however, this
may be challenging. Our results show that unfortunately only a
few providers offer a high domain-to-IP ratio, while other more
pressing factors (e.g., site popularity) may tilt the decision towards
other more important factors, such as latency, bandwidth, or points
of presence.
While pointer (PTR) records are often not configured, from a
privacy perspective, their operation conflicts with DoH/DoT and
ESNI as further discussed in Appendix C. Consequently, website
operators should not configure PTR records unless absolutely nec-
essary (e.g., for email servers). In addition, providers with a higher
rotation of IP addresses are more preferable, as this also helps in
improving privacy.
Hosting Providers. Hosting and CDN providers are in a more
privileged position to achieve meaningful impact in helping im-
prove the potential privacy benefits of ESNI, as they can control
the number of co-hosted domains per IP address, and the frequency
of IP addresses rotation. Unless website owners prefer otherwise,
providers could group more websites under the same IP address
(which, understandably, may not be desirable for some websites).
To improve k-anonymity even more meaningfully, providers
should cluster websites according to similarities in terms of traffic
patterns and popularity ranking, to hinder website fingerprinting at-
tempts. As discussed in §5.4, more dynamic hosting IP addresses can
also help improve visitors’ privacy. Currently, the number of web-
sites benefiting from more short-lived domain-to-IP mappings is
relatively small. While more frequent IP address changes may com-
plicate operational issues and are certainly more challenging to de-
ploy from a technical perspective (especially for smaller providers),
existing load balancing schemes already provide such a capability,
which could be tuned to also maximize privacy. In the future, it
may be worthwhile to explore more sophisticated schemes that
actively attempt to maximize privacy by increasing the “shuffling”
rate of co-hosted domains per IP address, to hinder attribution even
further, especially when considering more determined adversaries.
7.2 Impact
The deployment of domain encryption has various advantages and
disadvantages from the two—rather conflicting—perspectives of
Internet censorship and network visibility.
The existing plaintext exposure of domain names on the wire,
as part of DNS requests and TLS handshakes, has enabled the wide
use of network traffic filtering and censorship based on domain
names [2, 32, 39, 49, 82, 93]. In a future with all domain name infor-
mation being encrypted, DNS and SNI traffic will no longer be an
effective vector to conduct censorship. It is likely that censors will
shift to use IP-based blocking, which can be very effective if hosting
IP addresses of censored websites are stable and host only a handful
of sites or services [33, 50]. However, if providers start adapting
according to the above mentioned recommendations, the cost of
conducting IP-based blocking will increase, since a censor will have
to keep track of which IP address belong to which websites.
More importantly, the collateral damage caused by this type of
blocking will also increase dramatically if censored websites are
co-hosted with multiple other innocuous websites [52]. Although
some previous actions from the side of providers (e.g., hindering
domain fronting [40]) have shown that privacy is often given a
secondary priority [88], as the collateral damage caused to censors
may also impact significantly the providers, the renewed recent
focus on privacy as a potential competitive advantage by some
providers may encourage the deployment of hosting schemes that
will improve the privacy benefits of ESNI.
On the other hand, while providing many security and privacy
benefits, domain name encryption can be a “double-edged sword”
for network administrators who want to have full visibility and
control over domain resolutions in the networks under their re-
sponsibility. Until now, the operation of firewalls, intrusion detec-
tion systems, and anti-spam or anti-phishing filters has benefited
immensely from the domain name information extracted from net-
work traffic, as is evident by the series of works mentioned in §8
that employ DNS data to detect domain name abuses and malicious
online activities.
Under a full DoH/DoT and ESNI deployment, this visibility will
be lost, and systems based on domain reputation [9] and similar
technologies will be severely impacted. While many malicious do-
mains often hide themselves by sharing hosting addresses with
other innocuous and unpopular websites [96], it will be challenging
to detect and block them. A possible solution would be to rely solely
on TLS proxying using custom provisioned certificates, in order to
gain back the visibility lost by ESNI and DoH/DoT, which is already
a common practice used by transparent SSL/TLS proxies. Although
this will defeat any privacy benefits of these technologies, this may
be an acceptable trade off for corporate networks and other similar
environments.
8 RELATEDWORK
The domain name system is one of the core elements of the Internet
and plays an essential role for most online services. As a result, it
has been (ab)used for many different purposes. In this section, we
review prior works that investigate DNS from security and privacy
perspectives, and some recent studies that analyze the domain name
ecosystem via empirical measurements.
From a security perspective, domain names have been heavily
abused for illicit purposes. For instance, domain squatting is one
of the most common abuses. It is used to register domains that
are similar to those owned by well-known Internet companies. Do-
main squatting has many variations, including typo-squatting [5, 57,
96], homograph-based squatting [41, 85], homophone-based squat-
ting [76], bit-squatting [77], and combo-squatting [58]. Domain
names registered using these squatting techniques can then be used
for phishing [80, 85] or distributing malware [8]. To cope with these
unwanted domain names, DNS data has been used intensively to
create domain name reputation systems to detect abuse [9–11, 62].
Another major form of DNS abuse is DNS poisoning, in which
an on-path observer can easily observe and tamper with DNS re-
sponses to redirect users to malicious websites or to censor un-
wanted content [2, 32, 39, 67, 82, 93]. The exposure of domain
names in DNS requests and TLS handshakes (due to SNI) has also
been extensively used for traffic filtering and censorship [21, 49].
As mentioned in §2.1, the traditional design of DNS exposes In-
ternet users to severe privacy risks. In addition to on-path observers
(discussed in §3), previous works have also studied the privacy risk
associated with centralizing all domain name resolutions to third-
party recursive resolvers (e.g., 8.8.8.8, 1.1.1.1) [18, 19, 46, 59, 95, 105].
Zhao et al. [105] propose to add random noise and use private in-
formation retrieval to improve privacy by obfuscating DNS queries.
These proposals however have turned out to be impractical and inse-
cure under certain circumstances [19], and have not been adopted.
Lu et al. [69] propose privacy-preserving DNS (PPDNS), which
is based on distributed hash tables and computational private in-
formation retrieval. More recently, Hoang et al. [51] propose K-
resolver as a mechanism to distribute DoH queries among multiple
recursors, thus exposing to each recursor only a part of a user’s
browsing history. Sharing similar goals with our study, Shulman et
al. [95] examined the pitfalls of DNS encryption. By analyzing the
co-residence of zone files on name servers, the authors argue that
guessing visited domains by destination IP address does not provide
a significant advantage. Our findings, however, show that this is
only the case for a small number of domains that are co-hosted
with an adequate number of other domains.
Hounsel et al. [54] study the effect of DoH/DoT on performance
of domain name resolution and content delivery. The study finds
that the resolution time of DoH/DoT is longer than traditional
DNS resolution. Of the two new technologies, DoT provides better
page load times while DoH at best has the same page load times
as DNS. They also find that DoT and DoH perform worse than
DNS in networks with sub-optimal performance. Similarly, a recent
study by Bottger et al. [14] analyzes the DoH ecosystem and shows
that they can obtain more advanced privacy features of DoH with
marginal performance degradation in terms of page load times.
There have also been studies that investigated the robustness of
the DNS ecosystem through various types of measurements. Rama-
subramanian et al. [86] leverage a dataset of almost 600K domains
to study their trusted computing base, which is the set of name
servers on which a FQDN is hosted. The study shows that a typical
FQDN depends on 46 servers on average. Dell’Amico et al. [30] use
DNS data collected through both active and passive measurements
to also investigate the ecosystem of dependencies between websites
and other Internet services. Similarly to our work, Shue et al. [94]
use DNS data collected by both passive and active measurements to
study web server co-location and shared DNS infrastructure. How-
ever, their measurements were conducted from a single location,
while excluding all servers belonging to CDNs. Furthermore, the
passive DNS dataset used was collected by capturing network traf-
fic from the authors’ institute, therefore facing all potential issues
of a passive measurement discussed in §4.1. More recently, Hoang
et al. [52] revisit the results of Shue et al. [94] by conducting a
large-scale active DNS measurement study, which reveals that the
Web is still centralized to a handful of hosting providers, while IP
blocklists cause less collateral damage than previously observed
regardless of a high level of website co-location.
9 CONCLUSION
The deployment of encrypted SNI in TLS, combined with DNS over
HTTPS/TLS, will definitely provide many security benefits to Inter-
net users. However, as we have shown in this work, a significant
effort is still needed in order for these same technologies to provide
meaningful privacy benefits. More specifically, while domain name
information is encrypted, the IP address information is still visible
to any on-path observers and can be used to infer the websites
being visited.
Using DNS data collected through active DNS measurements,
we studied the degree of co-hosting of the current web, and its im-
plications in relation to ESNI’s privacy benefits. Quantifying these
benefits for co-hosted websites using k-anonymity, we observed
that the majority of popular websites (about half of all domains
studied) will gain only a small privacy benefit (k<16). Such a small
degree of co-hosting is not enough to withstand determined adver-
saries that may attempt to perform attribution by considering the
popularity or even the traffic patterns of the co-hosted websites
on an observed destination IP address. Domains that will obtain a
more meaningful privacy benefit (k>500) include only vastly less
popular websites mostly hosted by smaller providers, while 20% of
the websites, will not gain any benefit at all due to their one-to-one
mapping between domain name and hosting IP address.
We hope that our findings will raise awareness about the re-
maining effort that must be undertaken to ensure a meaningful
privacy benefit from the deployment of ESNI. In the meantime,
privacy-conscious website owners may seek hosting services of-
fered by providers that exhibit a high ratio of co-hosted domains
per IP address, and highly dynamic domain-to-IP mappings.
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A BREAKDOWN OF DOMAINS STUDIED
As shown in Table 3, our derived list comprises an average of 7.5M
popular fully qualified domain names (FQDNs) collected on a daily
basis, covering 1,031 TLDs. For the whole experiment duration, we
studied a total of 13.6M domains and 1,125 TLDs. Table 3 also shows
the top five largest TLDs in our dataset, with .com being the most
dominant, comprising more than 50% of the domains observed.
B POISONED RESPONSE SANITIZATION
While processing public DNS datasets from other sources (to which
we compare our findings in §6), we surprisingly discovered thou-
sands of low-ranked or obscure domains seemingly being co-hosted
on the same IP addresses that also host very popular websites, such
as Facebook and Twitter—which of course was not actually the case.
As part of our investigation, we observed that the authoritative
servers of most of these domains were located in China (using the
MaxMind dataset [71]). We then queried the same domains from
outside China using their authoritative servers, and indeed received
responses pointing to IP addresses that belong to either Facebook
or Twitter. By inspecting network traffic captures taken during
these name resolutions, we observed that the initial response con-
taining the wrong (falsified) IP address was followed by another
DNS response with the same valid DNS query ID that contained a
different (correct) IP address.
We attribute the above observed behavior to DNS-based censor-
ship by the “Great Firewall” (GFW) of China [1, 24, 67, 102, 104, 107],
which has also been observed and analyzed by previous studies [2,
39]. Censorship leakage happens due to the GFW’s filtering design,
which inspects and censors both egress and ingress network traffic.
While some censors (e.g., Pakistan, Syria, Iran) forge DNS responses
with NXDOMAIN [13, 20, 22, 73] or private addresses [12], mak-
ing them easier to distinguish, China poisons DNS responses with
routable public IP addresses belonging to other non-Chinese orga-
nizations [39, 49, 104]. In contrast to the findings of previous works,
however, in this case the real hosting IP addresses of the censored
domains are located within China, while previous works mostly
focus on investigating the blockage of websites that are hosted
outside China (e.g., google.com, facebook.com, blogger.com).
To validate our findings, we cross-checked the IP addresses from
second (real) DNS responses with the ones obtained by resolving
the same domains from locations in China. As the authoritative
servers of these domains are also in China, our queries did not cross
the GFW, which mostly filters traffic at border ASes [2, 26, 103],
and thus were not poisoned.
Table 4: Most frequently abused subnets in poisoned DNS
responses from China.
AS32934 AS13414 AS36351
Facebook Twitter SoftLayer
31.13.72.0 199.59.148.0 74.86.12.0
31.13.69.0 199.59.149.0 67.228.235.0
31.13.73.0 199.16.156.0 74.86.151.0
31.13.66.0 199.59.150.0 75.126.124.0
69.171.245.0 199.16.158.0 67.228.74.0
We follow this verification technique, where we issue additional
queries to resolve domains whose authoritative name server is
located in China and then detect injected DNS packets to exclude
poisoned responses from analyses. In total, we detected more than
21K domains based in China with poisoned responses. Table 4
shows the top /24 IP subnets belonging to Facebook, Twitter, and
SoftLayer, which are the most frequently observed in poisoned
responses. Our observation aligns with recent findings of other
censorship measurement studies [49, 75].
C REVERSE DNS LOOKUPS
The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) recommends that it
should be possible to conduct a reverse DNS lookup for every given
domain [37]. In a forward DNS lookup, a domain name is resolved
to an A (IPv4) record, while a reverse DNS lookup sends out an IP
address to ask for its associated FQDN. The DNS record storing
this information is called a PTR (pointer) record. Unless configured
to point to a FQDN by its owner, it is not compulsory to configure
PTR records for every IP address.
Although performing reverse DNS lookups seems to be a straight-
forward way of mapping a given IP address back to its associated
FQDN, this can potentially uncover only single-hosted domains.
More importantly, not all reverse DNS queries return a (meaning-
ful4) domain name because the IETF’s recommendation is only
optional, and thus not adopted universally.
We analyzed Rapid7’s reverse DNS dataset, which contains PTR
records for the whole public IPv4 space, to see how many IP ad-
dresses could be used to reveal the visited destinations under the
assumed global ESNI deployment, by just performing a reverse DNS
lookup.We find that there are 1.27B unique IP addresses having PTR
records. Of these, at least 172M (14%) of them point to a meaningful
FQDN (i.e., not in the form of dash-separated IP segments). Within
this set of domains, we could find 136K single-hosted domains
observed by our dataset. This means about 10% of single-hosted
domains have PTR records configured. Under a global ESNI deploy-
ment, IP addresses of these domains would be detrimental to the
privacy of users who connect to them.
As expected, we also observed more than 3M PTR records in
which domain names explicitly indicate through the prefix “mail”
that they correspond to email servers. These email servers support
PTR record because many providers will not accept messages from
other mail servers that do not support reverse lookups [66].
4Many PTR records are formatted with dash-separated IP segments. For example, the
Amazon EC2 IP address 54.69.253.182 has a PTR record to ec2-54-69-253-182.us-west-
2.compute.amazonaws.com, which may not actually correspond to a user-facing web
service.
